Journal #2

Like many who observe the Israel/Palestinian conflict, I am not particularly optimistic that a resolution is likely to develop in the near future. I see two main reasons that a resolution is not soon at hand. This first is the decreased incentive that the Israelis have to make concessions towards the Palestinians. The second is the changing political climate in Israel. The recent elections have shown that designing a peace deal doesn’t appear to be as important to the Israeli populace as it once was.

            Although there is a diminished incentive for the Israelis to push for the implementation of a two-state solution, some advantages remain for the pursuit of peace. It is true that there isn’t an Intifada raging at this time, but Hamas’ resistance has ensured that violence has maintained its place within this conflict and probably will for the foreseeable future. Recently, though, the dynamics of the fighting around Gaza have changed. The engagements associated with Operation Pillar of Defense ended in a way that I wouldn’t have predicted; there wasn’t a ground invasion by the IDF. There are really two main reasons an invasion was prevented. The first is that there was an intense and surprisingly successful effort to negotiate a truce. Israel was approaching an election season and politicians often want to avoid fighting wars that can damage their popularity. The second is that the Israelis were able to defend themselves in a way unlike during Operation Cast Lead of 2008-09 or the 2006 Lebanon war.

Israel has always been making strides to improve the capability of its military, and this march has only continued in recent years. One system in particular symbolizes this technological dominance and greatly enhances overall security. Iron Dome allowed the Israelis to down the rockets that posed the greatest threat to population centers; as a result, only a few Israelis were killed during last November’s hostilities. While it would be a mistake to deem Iron Dome the “magic bullet” in Israel’s long search for the ability to substantially quell Katyusha rocket attacks, it has allowed the Israelis to more effectively weather upticks in violence. This system does have its limitations; Iron Dome will never provide ironclad protection. With each missile costing around $50,000, and the fact that no system like this is fail-safe, the Israelis will still suffer casualties from rocket attacks. While less likely, the situation may arise where Israel must send its military back into the Gaza Strip. Israel is certainly more secure than in the past years, but current policies regarding the Palestinian community leave open the possibility for future conflicts and therefore there will always be benefits, albeit lessened ones, to working towards implementation of a two-state solution.

            While an increasing military dominance does play a role in the likelihood of a two-state solution being adopted, the ideologies of Israel’s main political parties are of equal importance. The weakening of Netanyahu and his Likud party has come from both the rise of conservative and liberal-secular cadres in recent elections, and when one looks at how wildly different these groups are it becomes difficult to imagine how a coalition government is going to agree to push for a real solution to the issue of the Palestinians. Netanyahu has advocated varying policies relating to the Palestinians. He has voiced his support for eventually implementing a two-state solution, yet has also continued the expansion of Israeli settlements within the West Bank – settlements which make it difficult to create a viable Palestinian state. It is also crucial to realize that the conflict with the Palestinians is not the security issue that Netanyahu focuses on. He directs a great deal of attention to the threat posed by the Iranian nuclear program (a threat that I feel is overhyped). Other parties and individuals in the Israeli government are also mainly directing attention toward issues aside from the two-state solution. Yair Lapid’s new centrist party, Yesh Atid, is focusing on domestic issues that the government has failed to address, issues such as: widening income inequality, education reform, and the tens of thousands of ultra-orthodox Jews who are exempt from military service and subsidize their religious studies with government stipends. Lapid supports a two-state solution, but says that any acceptable deal includes Israel keeping its largest settlements in the West Bank. While Yesh Atid did become the largest single party in the Knesset, the conservative forces also made significant gains in the recent elections. Naftali Bennett, who leads the conservative party known as Jewish Home, opposes granting statehood to the Palestinians. He advocates that Israelis settle the rural areas of the West Bank while letting the Palestinians govern themselves in the remaining areas under the watchful eyes of Shin Bet (Israel’s domestic intelligence service).

            It is hard to predict where the politically diverse Knesset will find common ground and exactly what policies it will advocate and what issues it will tackle. It is true that many Israelis want to see a two-state solution come about, but there are also those who are indifferent and those who are expressly opposed. I have a tough time imagining how Israel will make the collective decision to grant full statehood to the Palestinians. Dismantling settlements and working to relocate whole communities doesn’t strike me as something that the ideologically diverse Knesset will call for.

            If a two-state solution were to be adopted, what would it look like? It would probably consist of the Israelis dismantling the unauthorized and the smaller legal settlements in the West Bank, but also require the Palestinians to accept that the largest Israeli settlements will stay in place. With this continued Israeli presence the Palestinians would have to accept the construction of an Israeli controlled road system to connect these settlements to Israel proper as well as the presence of some Israeli security forces at the permanent settlements.

            Predicting the fate of both Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip is of the greatest difficulty. The symbolic value of Jerusalem makes it hard to imagine how the Israelis would be willing to cede any annexed areas to the Palestinians, if not take even more of the city. I can hardly guess how peace could come to Gaza. The Israelis have shown no desire to negotiate long-term peace with Hamas and Hamas hasn’t shown any real signs of ending its rule of Gaza and its armed resistance against Israel.

            There certainly are difficulties with defining exactly what a two-state solution would look like, but this isn’t why a solution is unlikely to materialize in the near future. Improved security has lessened the incentives to make concessions in the name of peace. And ideologically distant parties are unlikely to build common ground around the creation of an independent Palestine. These facts greatly diminish chances that a two-state solution will be achieved any time soon.